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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the trailblazing approach to communal property in the InterAmerican human rights system, and then applies that legal framework to the
distressing Nicaraguan initiative to construct a trans-oceanic canal. The estimated
$50 billion megaproject started initial development in December of 2014, and
seriously threatens the lands and livelihoods of the indigenous and AfroCaribbean communities in its path. I conclude that, if Nicaragua proceeds with
the Canal and several of its associated projects, the State will violate the
communities’ property rights, among other rights and freedoms. As a result,
Nicaragua, in accord with its international legal obligations, should halt the Canal
initiative until it secures the free, prior, and informed consent of the affected
populations.
II. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
The American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) is the
Western Hemisphere’s primary human rights treaty. It has been acceded to or
ratified by twenty-three States in the Americas, including Nicaragua.1 The
Convention’s Article 21 provides, in part:

* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. My International Human Rights Clinic
has joined with indigenous rights advocates in Nicaragua to challenge the Canal before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. Note that brief parts of this essay were adapted from my upcoming book with
Alejandra Gonza, THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS (forthcoming 2016).
1. American Convention on Human Rights, Signatories and Ratifications, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
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1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The
law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of
society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in
the cases and according to the forms established by law.2
While Article 21 was very contested and almost eliminated during the
Convention’s drafting process, the provision endured and now stands as one of
the strongest and most detailed expressions of an international right to property.
Due to the ideological disputes of the Cold War, neither the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nor the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provide for the right to property.3 The
First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms formulates a more constrained right than Article 21
of the American Convention.4 Like the European Protocol, both the African5 and
Arab Charters6 establish property rights—to a greater or lesser degree—but they
all omit an express right to compensation when the owner is deprived of
property.
Particularly in this sense, then, the American Convention provides a stronger
formulation of the right. Among other protections, it requires “just
compensation” upon deprivation of property.7 The EU Charter of Fundamental

2. Id.
3. Of course, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established the right to property. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
4. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1,
Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
Id.
5. The African Charter establishes: “The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the
provisions of appropriate laws.” African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 14, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58.
6. “Everyone has a guaranteed right to own private property, and shall not under any circumstances be
arbitrarily or unlawfully divested of all or any part of his property.” Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 31,
May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005), available at http://www.cartercenter.
org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/revised_Arab_charter_human_rights.pdf (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
7. American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 21.
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Rights takes this guarantee a step further: if one is “deprived of his or her
possessions,” then “fair compensation” must be paid “in good time.”8
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights renders the authoritative
interpretations of the American Convention. It has taken Article 21’s broad terms
and developed an expansive notion of property, including communal and private
property.9 The Inter-American concept encompasses tangible and intangible
property: “all movable and immovable property, corporeal and incorporeal
elements, and any other immaterial object that may have a value.”10
The Inter-American system has seen increasing numbers of cases where
States and private companies have sought to extract natural resources or develop
commercial projects on communal lands.11 In 2001, the Court issued its first
judgment on indigenous land rights, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v.
Nicaragua.12 Awas Tingni’s ruling on an indigenous right to communal property
was a first for an international human rights court.13 Beginning with this
judgment, the Court recognized “the unique and enduring ties that bind
indigenous communities to their ancestral territory.”14 According to the Court,
8. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 17, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83).
9. According to the Inter-American Court, corporations possess property rights, but these rights are only
relevant to the extent that they “encompass” human rights, such as a shareholder’s right to property. See, e.g.,
Perozo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 195, ¶¶ 399–400 (Jan. 28, 2009).
10. E.g., Memoli v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 265, ¶ 170 (Aug. 22, 2013); Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶ 122 (Feb. 6, 2001).
11. In addition to the judgments discussed, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has dealt
with such cases on several occasions. For example, in 2011, the Commission ordered Brazil to halt construction
on the Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant, a large initiative that endangered indigenous communities of the
Xingu River Basin in Pará, Brazil. Precautionary Measure 382/10: Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River
Basin, Pará, Brazil, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Annual Report, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 69 (2011), available at
www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). For
more Commission jurisprudence on the topic, see Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over Their Ancestral
Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 56/09 ¶ 74 (2009), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
indigenous/docs/pdf/AncestralLands.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
12. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79,
(Aug. 31, 2001).
13. The African Human Rights Courts were not yet in operation, and the European Court of Human
Rights still has not rendered a comparable interpretation. The non-binding Human Rights Committee, for its
part, does not even have competence to find violations of the right to property, because property was omitted
from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Internation Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. For more commentary on Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v.
Nicaragua, see S. James Anaya & Maia S. Campbell, Gaining Legal Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights:
The Story of the Awas Tingni Case in Nicaragua, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 117 (Deena R.
Hurwitz & Margaret L. Satterthwaite eds., 2009); S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas
Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
1 (2002).
14. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 131 (June 15, 2005); Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶
149.
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such a people’s relationship to traditional lands should be understood as “the
fundamental basis of its culture, spiritual life, integrity, and economic survival.”15
In Moiwana Community v. Suriname, the Court decided that the N’djuka
community, a non-native population of African descent, possessed a similar
relationship with its lands.16 Although the community had only lived in Moiwana
Village for a century, the Court found a significant spiritual and cultural nexus to
the territory—describing the connection as “all-encompassing.”17 Consequently,
the Court concluded that, despite lacking an official title to its lands, the
community’s ownership was nevertheless protected by Article 21.
In the Inter-American system, then, if communities have occupied their lands
“in accordance with customary practices,” they are generally entitled to official
recognition of their ownership rights.18 The Court is receptive to such claims of
“traditional” occupation. By requiring communities to follow a “cultural script,”
however, the Court’s approach limits the autonomy of indigenous peoples and
their capacity for change.19 Petitioners have satisfied the Court’s standard by
submitting the testimony of community members themselves, as well as reports
by anthropologists and other experts.
Once this standard is deemed fulfilled, the Court orders States, where
applicable, to delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title over the territories in
question within a reasonable amount of time.20 When necessary, States are
required to amend relevant domestic legislation and policy in order to ensure

15. Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 149.
16. Moiwana Community, supra note 14, at ¶ 133. For other Court judgments protecting the collective
land rights of Afro-Latin populations, see e.g. Afro-Descendant Communities Displaced From the Cacarica
River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 270, ¶ 353 (Nov. 20, 2013); Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 86
(Nov. 28, 2007).
17. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 86.
18. E.g., Moiwana Community, supra note 14, at ¶13, 1; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v.
Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 93 (Aug. 24, 2010).
In Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community, the Court utilized four factors to assess the “traditional character” of
the lands in question: “a) the Community’s occupation and trajectory of the land and its surrounding areas; b)
the toponymy of the area; c) technical studies prepared on the matter, and d) the alleged suitability of the land
being claimed.” Id.
19. See RICHARD PRICE, RAINFOREST WARRIORS: HUMAN RIGHTS ON TRIAL 238–39 (2011) (finding
Saramaka’s requirement that natural resources must be “traditionally used” for Article 21 protections to be
“disturbingly essentialist”); Ariel E. Dulitzky, When Afro-Descendants Became “Tribal Peoples”: The InterAmerican Human Rights System and Rural Black Communities, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 29, 42
(2010) (explaining that to obtain property protection, groups are pressured to show the Court an “essentialized
and frozen culture”); KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS,
CULTURE, STRATEGY 162–82 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 173; Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and
Embera Indigenous People of Bayano and their Members v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
284, ¶ 117, 134, 232 (Oct. 14, 2014).
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such communal rights to land.21 Until these measures are adopted, the Court
often forbids States, “or third parties acting with [their] acquiescence or
tolerance,” from engaging in acts that would affect the ancestral lands in any
way.22
In these cases, the Court has required restrictions on property rights to be: 1)
previously established by law; 2) necessary; 3) proportional; and 4) with the aim
of achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society.23 Furthermore, the
measure cannot constitute “a denial of [the community’s] traditions and customs
in a way that endangers the very survival of the group and of its members.”24
According to Saramaka People v. Suriname, in order to ensure that
concessions do not comprise a “denial of their traditions and customs,” States
must comply with three “safeguards.”25 First, the State must ensure “the effective
participation of the [community], in conformity with their customs and traditions,
regarding any development, investment, exploration or extraction plan” within
the territory.26 Second, the State must guarantee that the community will receive
“a reasonable benefit” from any such project.27 Third, the State must prevent
concessions “unless and until independent and technically capable entities, with
the State’s supervision, perform a prior environmental and social impact
assessment.”28
To ensure “effective” and “meaningful” participation, the Court has held that
States have “a duty to actively consult” with the community, which requires
“good-faith” efforts starting at the “early stages” of a development plan.29 Any
possible environmental or health risks must be communicated promptly to the
community.30 The consultations “should take account” of “traditional methods of
21. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 173; Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 214. When
domestic legislation and procedures fail to ensure these rights, the Court may also declare a violation of Article
2 (Domestic Legal Effects) of the American Convention. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 155;
Kuna Indigenous People, supra note 20, at ¶ 157.
22. E.g., Mayagna (Sumo) , supra note 12, at ¶ 173; Kuna Indigenous People, supra note 20, at ¶ 232.
23. See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 144 (June 17, 2005); Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 16, at ¶
127.
24. Saramaka People, supra 16, at ¶ 128. Note that the Court has emphasized that “the term ‘survival’ in
this context signifies much more than physical survival.” It refers to the community’s ability to maintain its
traditional way of life and its special relationship with its territory. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation
of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 185, ¶ 37 (Aug. 12, 2008).
25. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 128.
26. Id. at ¶ 129.
27. Id.
28. Id. In its August 2008 judgment interpreting the Saramaka decision, the Court stated that the studies
must “conform to the relevant international standards and best practices,” such as the Akwé:Kon Guidelines for
the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments. Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Interpretation of the Judgment, supra note 24, at ¶ 41.
29. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 133.
30. Id.
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decision-making;” for example, it is the indigenous community, not the State,
who must decide which person or persons will represent the community in the
process.31
While all consultations must have “the objective of reaching an agreement,”
the Court only requires States to obtain consent in certain circumstances.32 With
regard to “large-scale development or investment projects that would have a
major impact” within indigenous territory, States have “a duty not only to
consult” with the affected community, “but also to obtain [its] free, prior, and
informed consent [FPIC], according to [its] customs and traditions.”33 The Court
alternately described such projects as “major development or investment plans
that may have a profound impact on the property rights of [the community] to a
large part of their territory.”34
Saramaka’s standard on FPIC was at the vanguard of international law,35 and
has proven very influential for international human rights institutions, such as the
UN Human Rights Committee36 and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights.37 The Court’s framework to protect indigenous lands and
resources is far from perfect,38 of course, and even consent has its limits.39

31. Id. In addition, in the subsequent judgment, Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Court expanded the
applicability of consultation rights, extending them to “any administrative and legislative measures that may
affect [indigenous and tribal] rights.” Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and
Reparations, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 166 (June 27, 2012). The Sarayaku Court even
regarded the right to consultation as a “general principle of international law.” Id. at ¶ 164.
32. Kichwa Indigenous People, supra note 31.
33. Id. at ¶ 134 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at ¶ 137.
35. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples established consent as the
“objective” of consultations, but only expressly required consent in a couple of drastic scenarios: when the
project will result in a community’s “relocation” from its traditional lands, and in situations involving the
storage or disposal of toxic waste within territories. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, art. 10, 29(2) U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 Sept. 13, 2007.
36. See Poma Poma v. Peru, Commc’n No. 1457/2006, U.N. Human Rights Committee, ¶7.6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/ (2009) (holding, in part: “The Committee considers that participation in the decisionmaking process must be effective, which requires not mere consultation but the free, prior and informed consent
of the members of the community”).
37. See African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on a Human Rights-Based Approach
to Natural Resources Governance, 51st Sess., Res. 224 (2012), available at http://www.achpr.
org/sessions/51st/resolutions/224 (“[A]ll necessary measures must be taken by the State to ensure participation,
including the free, prior and informed consent of communities, in decision making related to natural resources
governance”); Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) v. Kenya, Afr. Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights,
No. 276/2003, para. 291 (Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/comunications/
276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (holding that with
respect to “any development or investment projects that would have a major impact within the Endorois
territory, the State has a duty not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and
informed consent, according to their customs and traditions”).
38. See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the InterAmerican Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 113, 170 (2013) (explaining how there are many opportunities for States
to exploit the Court’s safeguards).
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Nevertheless, FPIC is an important means to safeguard indigenous rights, and it
clearly must apply to the Nicaraguan Canal initiative.
III. PLANS FOR THE CANAL AND NICARAGUA’S INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
As stated above, Nicaragua ratified the American Convention; further, it
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction and must follow the Tribunal’s authoritative
interpretations of Article 21. The bewildering scale of the megaproject easily
meets the Court’s FPIC standard: “large-scale development or investment
projects that would have a major impact” on indigenous lands.40 As a result, the
affected communities must provide their free, prior, and informed consent before
the initiative can proceed.
In 2013, President Daniel Ortega pushed a bill through Congress, with little
debate and no bidding process, which granted a fifty-year, renewable concession
to Wang Jing and his corporation, the Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development
Investment Company (HKND).41 The Canal, according to HKND, will be three
times as long (178 miles) and almost twice as deep (ninety-two feet) as the
Panama Canal.42 HKND also intends to build new seaports, railways, highways,
an oil pipeline, and tourist resorts, among other developments.43
Ortega’s government granted HKND powers to expropriate land along the
planned route, which could affect thousands of Nicaraguan property owners.44 A
significant portion of the announced route intrudes upon the communal lands of
indigenous and Afro-Caribbean communities in Nicaragua.45 This includes the
autonomous territories of the Creoles and the indigenous Sumo and Rama
groups. The displacement could cause dire social, cultural, and economic
consequences for the communities. For example, if the Rama people of
39. For example, a small-scale operation that destroys a sacred site could devastate a community, yet it
would not likely require consent by the Court. See Jo Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A
Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 51, 98 (2009).
40. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 134.
41. See, e.g., Jon Lee Anderson, Breaking Ground on the Nicaragua Canal, NEW YORKER (Jan. 2, 2015),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/breaking-ground-nicaragua-canal (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); Chris Kraul, Nicaragua Canal: A Giant Project with Huge
Environmental Costs, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 5, 2015), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/nicaragua_canal_a_
giant_project_with_huge_environmental_costs/2871 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
42. See, e.g., Jonathan Watts, Land of Opportunity—and Fear—Along Route of Nicaragua’s Giant New
Canal, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2015), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/20/-sp-nicaraguacanal-land-opportunity-fear-route (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
43. See Anderson, supra note 41; HKND Entrega Estudio de Impacto Ambiental y Social, LA PRENSA
(June 1, 2015), http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2015/06/01/nacionales/1842373-hknd-entrega-estudio-de-impactoambiental-y-social (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
44. Id.
45. Advocates have estimated that fifty-two percent of the announced route intrudes upon the communal
lands of indigenous and Afro-Caribbean communities.
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Nicaragua—the last speakers of the Rama language—are dispersed, their
language could be silenced forever.46
In addition, scientists and environmental experts have expressed alarm about
the megaproject’s threat to nature and wildlife. The planned route slices through
wetlands, nature reserves, and rainforests. Lake Nicaragua, Central America’s
largest body of freshwater, faces particular danger: one third of the Canal could
traverse the lake, which would need to be dredged extensively.47 The digging
could contaminate the water—a key source of drinking water for the country—
and threaten indigenous fish and other species.48
Biologists Jorge Huete-Pérez and Axel Meyer wrote that the Canal would
cause nothing less than “an environmental disaster in Nicaragua and beyond.”49
They stated that the project would likely “destroy around 400,000 hectares of
rainforests and wetlands,” including “some of the most fragile, pristine and
scientifically important marine, terrestrial and lacustrine ecosystems in Central
America.”50
Some communities that rely on these territories for their livelihood have
protested that their consent was never sought for the Canal—nor were they ever
“actively consulted in good faith,” as required by international law.51 To the
contrary, HKND delegations have crossed into communal lands, and left
signposts and other markings of the Canal’s planned route, without any
explanation at all.52 In other cases, information was hastily presented without an
opportunity for meaningful exchange; there are also reports that Ortega’s
government has attempted to coerce or bribe certain community members to
obtain their acquiescence.53
Finally, as held in Saramaka People, States cannot grant concessions until
environmental and social impacts have been fully evaluated.54 HKND hired the
firm Environmental Resources Management (ERM) to conduct impact
assessments; on May 31, 2015, HKND delivered the ERM report to the
46. See Kate Kilpatrick, Canal ‘Will Destroy We,’ AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Apr. 9, 2015), http://projects.
aljazeera.com/2015/04/nicaragua-canal/displaced.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
47. Kraul, supra note 41; Scientists Question Rush to Build Nicaragua Canal, PHYS.ORG (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://phys.org/news/2015-03-scientists-nicaragua-canal.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
48. Kraul, supra note 41.
49. Jorge Huete-Pérez & Axel Meyer, Conservation: Nicaragua Canal Could Wreak Environmental
Ruin, NATURE INT’L WEEKLY J. SCI. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nature.com/news/conservation-nicaraguacanal-could-wreak-environmental-ruin-1.14721. Huete-Pérez is a past president of the Nicaraguan Academy of
Sciences. Id.
50. Id.
51. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 133.
52. Kilpatrick, supra note 46.
53. Id.; see also Roy Moncada, Indígenas de Nicaragua Resisten Presión del Gobierno por el Canal, LA
PRENSA (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2016/02/08/nacionales/1982372-indigenas-nicaraguaresisten-presion-del-gobierno-canal (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
54. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 129.
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Nicaraguan government.55 In this way, Nicaragua granted the full concession and
allowed nearly six months of work on the megaproject before the completion of
any substantial impact studies.56
IV. CONCLUSION
All potential impacts and benefits resulting from the Canal initiative must be
fully discussed with the owners of these communal lands—following the above
Inter-American parameters closely. If the communities decide to reject the
proposal, it is their right to do so under Article 21 of the American Convention,
in recognition of their distinctive relationship to their territories and resources. To
conclude, Nicaragua is the poorest nation in the Americas, after Haiti. Clearly,
Ortega’s government must pursue opportunities to reduce poverty and strengthen
the national economy. However, it cannot do so without fully democratic
processes, inclusive multicultural policies, and a strict adherence to its
international and national legal obligations.

55. HKND Entrega a Nicaragua el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental del Gran Canal, EL NUEVO DIARIO
(June 1, 2015), http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/361307-hknd-entrega-nicaragua-impacto-ambient
al-gran-cana/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
56. Of course, more objections could be made against the recent studies: they were finished too quickly
and they lacked indigenous/Afro-Caribbean participation, among others.
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